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Parents, not laws, ultimately protect children both online and offline. If
legislation places adults at legal risk because of the presence of children in
virtual worlds, adults will exit those worlds, and children will be isolated into
separate spaces. This will not improve safety for children. Instead, this Article
suggests that Congress enact measures that encourage filtering technology and
parental tools that will both protect children in virtual worlds, and protectfree
speech online.
Table of Contents
I. Introduction ................................................................................ 12 16
II. Parentalism and Cyberbalkanization ........................................... 1218
A . Cyberbalkanization .............................................................. 1219
B. Speech and Child Protection Online .................................... 1224
C. The Effect of Isolation on Children ..................................... 1231
III. Filtering and Virtual Worlds ....................................................... 1233
A . Basic Chat Filtering ............................................................. 1234
B. Filtering Reality: Instancing and Quest-Phasing ................. 1234
C. M aking Filtering Better ....................................................... 1237
D. Commerce, Anonymity, and Filtering ................................. 1239
IV. Necessary Law Enforcement in Virtual Worlds .......................... 1240
V . C onclusion .................................................................................. 1242
* Associate Professor of Law, Washington & Lee University School of Law. Thanks to
all the participants of the Protecting Virtual Playgrounds: Children, Law, and Play Online
Symposium at Washington & Lee University. Thanks to Russ Miller, Robin Wilson, Joan
Shaughnessy, Sam Calhoun, Ted Castronova, Greg Lastowka, and Berin Szoka for comments
and suggestions. This Article is dedicated to the memory of Louise Halper, without whose
guidance and support this symposium would not have been possible.
1215
66 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 1215 (2009)
L Introduction
When lawmakers consider kids and virtual worlds, the urge to legislate
appears overwhelming.' The mix of children and new media has always
inspired calls for crackdowns. Plays, novels, comic books, movies, television,
and Socratic philosophy were all broadly charged with corrupting the youth
when they first appeared. Given the growth of virtual worlds such as World of
Warcraft and Club Penguin, and the explosive popularity of social networking
sites and games, legislation may be inevitable.2
Laws protecting kids have always been popular and necessary. But
parents, not laws, ultimately protect children.3 This Article argues that parents
and communities cannot-and should not-be replaced by laws as sources of
protection for children. In virtual worlds, parents play with their children, and
1. The ramp-up to virtual world regulation to protect children has thus far included
hearings, see Congress Holds First Hearing on Virtual Worlds: Linden Lab CEO Philip
Rosedale Testifies, VIRTUALLY BLIND, Apr. 1, 2008, http://virtuallyblind.com/2008/04/01/
congress-virtual-worlds (last visited Sept. 29, 2009) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review), and a directive to the Federal Trade Commission to examine and report on the
availability of explicit materials within virtual worlds to minors. See H.R. REP. No. 110-92, at
68 (2008) (expressing concern over explicit content accessible by minors). Specifically, the
House Report stated:
The Committee is concerned about reports of explicit content that can be easily
accessed by minors on increasingly popular virtual reality web programs. The
Committee directs the FTC to issue a consumer alert to educate parents on the
content that is available to children on virtual reality web programs. In addition, no
later than 9 months after enactment of this Act, the Commission shall submit a
report to the Appropriations Committee discussing the types of content on virtual
reality sites and what steps, if any, these sites take to prevent minors from accessing
content.
Id.
2. See Stardoll Doubles Membership over Year to Hit 20MRegistered Users, VIRTUAL
WORLDS NEWS, Aug. 15, 2008, http://www.virtualworldsnews.com/2008/08/stardoll-
double.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2009) ("Stardoll announced yesterday that it had reached 20
million registered users, double the 10 million registered users that Stardoll announcedjust over
a year ago and continuing to grow at about 25 thousand new registrations per day.") (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Strategy Analytics: Virtual Worlds Projected to
Mushroom to Nearly One Billion Users: $8 Billion Market Value Projectedfor User Services
Value Projected for User Services, REUTERS, June 3, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/
pressRelease/idUS 185045+03-Jun-2008+BW20080603 (last visited Sept. 29,2009) ("[O]ver
the next ten years some 22 percent of global broadband users will have registered for one or
more virtual worlds resulting in a market approaching one billion registrants and an eight billion
dollar services opportunity.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
3. See JOHN PALFREY & URs GASSER, BORN DIGITAL: UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST
GENERATION OF DIGITAL NATIvES 105 (2008) ("Changes in the law and regulation are not the
primary ways to protect our kids, but the role of the state is important all the same. The law, as
a general matter, can offer a backstop in terms of keeping children safe.").
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online communities have developed norms of child protection. If legislation
reinforces these norms, it is a positive development.4 But if, as seems likely,
legislation disrupts communities by separating families out into separate "child-
friendly" and "mature" worlds, children will lose much of the protection they
currently enjoy in virtual worlds. Virtual worlds are, among other things,
communities of real-world people. And, like real-world communities, these
communities have their own norms that often operate to constrain behavior.5
Before we legislate, we ought to note what tools and norms are already in place.
Recognition of these norms is an important part of introducing order to virtual
worlds. Without such an inquiry, laws might displace useful norms and make
things worse.
It is important to note what this Article does not assert. It does not argue
that game gods (the companies that create and maintain virtual worlds) should
not aggressively seek out and ban sexual predators or assist law enforcement in
stopping predators online.6 They can and must. And this Article does not
argue that police should not aggressively investigate and arrest virtual world
denizens who target children for sexual gratification.7 Again, police can and
must act against real predators.8
This Article makes three limited points. First, that parentalist legislation is
likely to disrupt speech and ultimately break up virtual world communities.
Second, that this balkanization will isolate children from the very communities
that protect them. And third, that communities and the virtual worlds industry
may be able to avoid this by developing better filters to protect children in
virtual worlds.
4. See id. at 98 ("The best way to mitigate the Internet safety risks that our children face
is to combine.., education, technology development, social norms, and the law.").
5. See ROBERT C. ELLCKSON, ORDER WITHouT LAW 123-36 (1991) (providing a
taxonomy of self-help methods communities use to regulate without reference to law).
6. See FacebookDrops Sex Offenders, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 20,2009, at Al 1 (reporting that
Facebook has removed over 5,000 sex offenders from its site and MySpace has removed over
90,000 sex offenders from its site); Sex Offenders Face WebsiteBans, BBC NEWS, Apr. 4,2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uknews/7328170.stm (last visited Sept. 29,2009) ("Sex offenders'
e-mail addresses are to be passed to social networking sites like Facebook and Bebo to prevent
them contacting children.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also
Keeping the Internet Devoid of Sexual Predators Act of 2008 (KIDS Act of 2008), 42 U.S.C.
§ 16915a et seq. (2006) (stating requirements for sex offenders regarding websites).
7. See generally Madeleine Mercedes Plasencia, lnternet Sexual Predators: Protecting
Children in the Global Community, 4 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 15 (2000) (detailing the
numerous instances of police enforcement against predators who seek real-world meetings with
children).
8. See generally supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing instances in which
police took action against sexual predators).
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II. Parentalism and Cyberbalkanization
Imagine that you join a movie discussion group in a virtual world. The
discussion is held in the virtual private home of one of the discussants. The
discussants, through their avatars, analyze the recently-released and deeply
controversial Academy nominated movie, The Reader, which involves a
complicated discussion of sexual misconduct toward minors, individual guilt,
and collective guilt for the crimes of the Third Reich.9 The conversation veers
from the sexual to the political. Because the discussion occurs within a virtual
world, members of the discussion group are able to import stills from the movie
into the virtual world to underscore their arguments, or are able to shape the
reality around them to reflect scenes from the movie.
Imagine your surprise if you and the other discussants were subsequently
arrested by the real-world police for lewd and lascivious conduct toward a
minor.'0 The reason? One of the "adults" at the meeting was actually a fifteen-
year-old boy, posing as an adult avatar. No one at the meeting had the slightest
idea that a child was sitting behind one of the adult avatars; in fact, the home
was in an area that children were not supposed to enter at all.
This case is intentionally hard. On the one hand, we have real-world laws
that apply to conduct between adults and children regardless of the knowledge
of the adult. For example, statutory rape is a strict liability crime: It is no
defense for an adult to claim that she did not know the age of the minor.1
On the other hand, internet anonymity has shaped policy and law online.
If website operators were liable every time a child posing as an adult accessed
mature content, we would have to shut the Internet down. Therefore, the
governing rule thus far has been that the First Amendment prevents the
9. THE READER (Mirage Enterprises et al. 2008).
10. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-60 et seq. (2007) (listing the Alabama statutory sexual
offenses); CAL. PENAL CODE § 288 (West 2008) (listing the elements and penalties of the
California statutory offense of lewd or lascivious acts); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202.1 (2007)
(listing the elements of the North Carolina statutory offense of taking indecent liberties with
children); see also Dalia Lithwick, Teens, Nude Photos and the Law, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 23,
2009, at 18 (discussing whether every case of lewdness should be prosecuted by police to the
fullest extent of the law and whether the law encompasses too much conduct); "Sexting": Racy
Teen Messaging Could Be Illegal, NPR Talk of the Nation (National Public Radio, radio
broadcast Feb. 18, 2009) (discussing whether sex message texting amongst teens should be
legally restricted), available at 2009 WLNR 3200250.
11. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Disler, 884 N.E.2d 500, 509 (Mass. 2008) ("[T]he
Commonwealth is not required to prove the defendant's knowledge of the victim's age as an
element of the crime."); People v. Nyx, 734 N.W.2d 548, 565-66 (Mich. 2007) ("Because there
was no indication that the Legislature intended to abrogate the common law, this Court held that
sexual penetration of a victim who is at least 13 but less than 16 constitutes a strict liability
offense and, therefore, 'reasonable mistake of age' is not a defense.").
1218
VIRTUAL PARENTALISM
application of criminal law to the unwitting transmission of adult content to
children.
12
This Article explores the hard choices we will have to make in selecting
child-protecting laws for virtual worlds. If we are clumsy, we could either
leave children unprotected or drive adults out of virtual worlds altogether,
functionally destroying the promise of the technology.
A. Cyberbalkanization
Imposing liability on unwitting adults for communications received by
minors will cause adults and children to move into separate virtual worlds. We
should act cautiously before segregating children from adults online. Scholars
have long pointed out the dangers of internet segregation. m3 Online forums,
blogs, and even news outlets provide information consumers with the necessary
tools to confirm pre-existing opinion rather than engage in democratic
discourse.1 4 Fragmented discourse creates an "echo chamber" effect, in which
groups that only speak internally reinforce the most extreme positions in the
group.'5 There are criminal risks as well as political ones. 16 Groups with
common perverse interests gather online, and reinforce each others' preferences
as "normal."' 7  These perversion support groups are the stuff of internet
legend.'8 The creation of these internet backwaters should be of concern to the
12. See infra Part II.B (discussing speech and child protection online).
13. See CAss R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0, at 21 (2007) (discussing the threat that the
ability to filter presents to democracy).
14. See id. at 51-55 (discussing how consumers can obtain information through electronic
channels without offering an untested opinion in democratic discourse).
15. See id. at 6, 76-78 (discussing how the characteristics of online discourse creates an
environment that fosters extreme positions that normally would not carry any legitimacy through
democratic discourse).
16. See id. at 57 (describing at length the criminal risks involved when consumers do not
test their views through democratic discourse).
17. See Plasencia, supra note 7, at 17 (commenting on the ease in which pedophiles can
interact with others in chat groups). Plasencia specifically stated:
With quick and anonymous virtual travel made possible through the Internet,
pedophiles are "logging on" and forming chat groups, swapping pornographic
images and sharing true stories of sexual activity with children. This process of
bonding with other pedophiles by forming support sites in cyberspace has been
referred to as "virtual validation."
Id. (citations omitted).
18. See id. (discussing activities of perversion support groups).
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law. Instead, current regulatory approaches will likely create more such
backwaters, to the detriment of children.'
9
There are two additional reasons to be cautious about segregating adults
from children. The first is that parental involvement with children's activities
is the best way to keep children safe.2° If virtual worlds are segregated into
adult and children's worlds, parents will no longer be interested in the same
games as their children, and will no longer play alongside their children.21
Second, once responsible adults exit the worlds set aside for children, only
those adults willing to lie to enter those worlds-predators-will remain in
among the children.22
Segregating virtual worlds will destroy much of the promise of virtual
world technology. Some technologies, including virtual worlds, draw
communities together.23 Virtual worlds are in a serious sense the opposite of
the cyberbalkanization process. They revolve around a shared simulated space
and involve players in common goals and activities. The design of a virtual
world is predominantly the design of spaces and activities for the population-
including parents and children-to experience together.24
19. See Berin Szoka & Adam Thierer, COPPA 2.0: The New Battle over Privacy, Age
Verification, Online Safety & Free Speech, 16.11 PROGRESS ON POINT 1, 30 (2009), available at
http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/2009/pop 16.1 1-COPPA-and-age-verification.pdf("Here, one
must firther ask if attempting to quarantine children from adults (however indirectly) actually
advances, on net, a strong governmental interest in child protection.").
20. See PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 3, at 110 ("Parents and teachers need to become a
much bigger part of the solution, and soon.").
21. See Szoka & Thierer, supra note 19, at 30 ("A substantial portion of those interactions
involve parents talking to their own kids, older and younger siblings communicating with one
another, teachers and mentors talking to their students, or even co-workers of different ages
communicating. Even when adult-minor communications involve complete strangers, there is
typically a socially-beneficial purpose."); see also JOHN D. AND CATHERINE T. MACARTHUR
FOUNDATION, LIvING AND LEARNING wrIT NEW MEDIA: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM THE
DIGITAL YOUTH PROJECT 39 (2008), available at http://digitalyouth.ischool.berkeley.edu/files/
report/digitalyouth-WhitePaper.pdf ("In contexts of peer-based learning, adults.., have an
important role to play .... Unlike instructors in formal educational settings.... these adults
are passionate hobbyists and creators, and youth see them as experienced peers, not as people
who have authority over them. These adults exert tremendous influence in setting communal
norms....").
22. See Szoka & Thierer, supra note 19, at 30 ("Such a quarantine is unlikely to stop
adults with truly nefarious intentions from communicating with minors, as systems designed to
exclude participation by adults in a 'kids-only' or 'adolescents-only' area can be easily
circumvented.").
23. See SuNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 139-40 (suggesting an understanding of the
blogosphere as a "huge market" and a "gigantic town meeting"); id. at 49 ("Of course the
Internet can bring people together rather than drawing apart. Countless people are using the
Internet to build larger and more diverse communities.").
24. See TOM BOELLSTORFF, COMING OF AGE IN SECOND LIFE 51 (2008) ("The essential
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For example, the virtual World of Warcraft begins by introducing the
concept of a quest-a task that can be performed for some in-world reward.25
Higher level quests require more cooperation, and more people become
involved in seeking the same goal.26 The endgame of World of Warcraft,
commonly called "raiding," involves large groups of people working together in
a highly coordinated fashion to achieve complex goals.27 Virtual worlds
provide a forum for common discourse. In a virtual world, people from across
the political, geographical, and financial spectrum cross paths.28 Many quests
or tasks are not possible without a larger group.29 Entire guilds--or groups of
groups-must focus on larger problems, such as how to organize a large group
of people on a given task over a long period of time.3°
And of course, while people play, they talk.31 Like the workplace, virtual
worlds have become a setting where citizens talk across the divide. What
technology has wrought--separating neighborhoods out because of the low cost
of driving to work, and family members from one another because of the search
for jobs-technology can now undo. Virtual world technology reconstructs the
social systems and the physical systems that were the rule for the majority of
human existence.32 Conversation in a guild channel in World of Warcraf
lesson that we have abstracted from our experiences with [the virtual word] is that a cyberspace
is defined more by the interactions among the actors within it than by the technology with which
it is implemented."); id. at 180 (noting that virtual worlds constitute communities shaped by the
residents within them); see also Szoka & Thierer, supra note 19, at 30.
25. See EDWARD CASTRONOVA, SYNTHETIC WORLDS: THE BUSINESS AND CULTURE OF
ONLINE GAMES 106 (2005) (describing a quest).
26. Id.
27. See Joshua Fairfield & Edward Castronova, Dragon Kill Points, in RATIONAL MODELS
SEMINAR, UNIv. OF CI-I. 2006, at 1-3 (SSRN Working Paper Series No. 958945) [hereinafter
Dragon Kill Points] (discussing the complicated organizational efforts that go into organizing a
raid).
28. See Dmitri Williams et al., Who Plays, How Much, and Why? Debunking the
Stereotypical Ganer Profile, 13 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMMC'N 993, 993-94 (2008),
available at http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/121394419/PDFSTART
(discussing the interactions between people who interact in a virtual world).
29. See Dragon Kill Points, supra note 27, at 2 ("[A] cohesive and persistent group
structure... must be built and maintained over the course of many months if not years.").
30. See id. (discussing the coordination amongst players that is necessary to complete a
successful raid); see also CASTRONOVA, supra note 25, at 121-22 (explaining briefly the
formation of guilds within synthetic worlds).
31. See CASTRONOVA, supra note 25, at 67-68 (describing communicative aspects of
virtual worlds).
32. See id. at 121-25 (discussing the effects of virtual technology on social systems); Nick
Yee, Playing with Someone, in THE DAEDALUS PROJECT (2005), http://www.nickyee.com/
daedalus/archives/00 1468.php (discussing a study that demonstrates that garners often play with
people they already know in real life, suggesting that gaming is not anti-social as critics
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resembles nothing so much as conversation around a (slightly rowdy) kitchen
table.33
Virtual world relationships reflect real-world connections? 4 People do not
enter virtual worlds purely anonymously. They do so ingroups.35 Groups join
servers together, families play together, and (this is the important point) parents
often play with children.36 Children know many of the people with whom they
interact from real life. Uncles and the occasional aunt are often in-world.
Cousins abound. The distances that have dissected real-world families of
course do not matter in a virtual world.
Virtual worlds present a compelling mix of fantasy and reality.37 People
enjoy content, but enjoy it more in the company of friends and family. Content
draws people into virtual worlds, but a real sense of community is what causes
people to remain in the world. Many players have no interest in a world that
lacks their social network, and often players will return to a given world purely
because of the social network that they left behind.
Children are protected by their own communities. Often children have a
separate designation within the guild community that theyjoin. For example,
in the author's guild, children of members play alongside their parents, and
receive a special guild designation that permits the guild to keep the chat
channels that children can hear free of profanity.38
At the same time, children are entering worlds in which rough speech and
rough-and-tumble discourse are the norm. Profanity in virtual public spaces is
believe).
33. See CASTRONOVA, supra note 25, at 100-02 (drawing parallels between virtual world
conversation and real-world conversation).
34. See id. at 121 (commenting on the similarities between real world and virtual world
relationships); Williams et al., supra note 28, at 31 (suggesting "the displacement of previously
existing relationships by new in-game ones").
35. See Nick Yee, The Demographics of Guilds, in THE DAEDALUS PROJECT (2008),
http://www.nickyee.corn/daedalus/archives/001635.php (last visited Sept. 29,2009) (reviewing
results in a study on the trends regarding virtual world guilds) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
36. See Nick Yee, Kids and MMOs, in THE DAEDALUs PRoJECT 9 (2008),
http://www.nickyee.com/daedalus/archives/001627.php?page9 (last visited Sept. 29, 2009)
(noting that "[a]s we've seen before, parents can play with kids productively," and discussing a
survey that highlights the risks involved with gaming while stressing the importance that parents
get involved and play with their children) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
37. See CASTRONOVA, supra note 25, at 107 ("The combination of these efforts produces a
society with Earth-like richness and complexity, even though the objects about which this
society dances are completely fantastical.").
38. See Hrafnwarband, Index, http://www.hrafnwarband.com (last visited Sept 29,2009)
(serving as a forum for garners) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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far more common than is the case in the real world.39 Crude sexual or
scatological references are quotidian.40 Politics4' and religion42 are also
common subjects-and the discussion is sure to cause a dispute with multiple
parties chiming in. Political protests, analysis of legislation, party politics, and
other subjects are routinely trotted out.43 On the other hand, many people avoid
such topics-as they do in real life--out of a sense that there are people in the
same space who disagree with them. Since guild and group membership is at a
premium, users of a space will often moderate their language or defuse conflict
in order to get along.
The difficulty is that children may be exposed to rough-and-tumble
discourse. Thus, we are presented with a choice between two alternatives: Ban
offensive speakers when their speech reaches children's ears, through the
application of criminal or other regulatory law, or improve filtering technology,
so that children can share a world with their parents, but can only see and hear
what their parents permit. This Article advocates the latter.
The Article develops the idea of this filtering technology below, but it is
worth mentioning here that the existence of filtering technology does much to
satisfy both the need to protect children and the need to preserve speech.
Imagine that one simply enters the world with all other users turned "off." A
parent would only permit the child to be able to speak with and hear another
user that the parent truly knows. Thus, without one whit of regulation, the
question of rough chat or of predators who seek to use online contacts to foster
offline meetings can be resolved through parents' self-help. Those people
simply cannot interact with-in fact would not even exist with reference to-
the child.
39. See Jack Balkin, Virtual Liberty: Freedom to Design and Freedom to Play in Virtual
Worlds, 90 VA. L. REv. 2043, 2058-59 (2004) (noting that one incentive a state may have for
regulating virtual worlds is the "violent, offensive, or indecent" content); Peter Jenkins, The
Virtual World as a Company Town-Freedom of Speech in Massively Multiple Online Role
Playing Games, 8 J. INTERNET L. 1, 3-5 (2004) (discussing whether Marsh v. Alabama, 326
U.S. 501 (1946), allows for First Amendment protection in the virtual world context), available
at SSRN ID No. 565181.
40. See BOELLSTORFF, supra note 24, at 151-65 (discussing the common use of sexual
references in virtual worlds).
41. See StJNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 80 (noting that politics is a subject that often comes
up in conversation in virtual worlds).
42. See BOELLSTORFF, supra note 24, at 185 (noting that religion is a common
conversation topic in virtual worlds).
43. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 46-57 (discussing popular topics of conversation in
virtual worlds); see also PETER LUDLow & MARK WALLACE, THE SECOND LIFE HERALD: THE
VIRTUAL TABLOID THAT WITNESSED THE DAWN OF THE METAVERSE 171-72 (2007) (recounting
protest movements within the virtual world that "smacked of politics").
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We are in very real danger of not following this path, and instead relying
on the usual mix of laws to jail speakers who unwittingly transmit content to
avatars that turn out to be run by children. The problem is that if speakers are
liable for this content, free discourse within virtual worlds will be
compromised. Rather than suffer the risk of being overheard, adults will either
turn off the most promising technology for cooperation and discourse that we
have seen in some time, or they will segregate children into separate worlds.
B. Speech and Child Protection Online
The usual argument is that we can protect either speech or children. 44 This
Article argues that this is a false choice, and that free speech values are an
integral part of any system that seeks to protect children in virtual worlds. At a
minimum, people should be free to speak up about dangers to children in
virtual worlds without fear of reprisal.
An example may clarify the problem. In 2003, Michigan philosophy
professor Peter Ludlow published an account of teen virtual prostitution in the
world The Sims Online (TSO).45 Ludlow had developed an online journal,
called the A lphaville Herald, which chronicled events within TSO.46 Electronic
Arts, the creator of TSO, subsequently banned Ludlow's avatar, wiping out the
significant investment Ludlow had made in his reputation in that world.47 The
Alphaville Herald was forced to move to a different virtual world-Second
Life-and ceased reporting on events within TSO.4s
From the Ludlow event we can see that game gods can use their power to
banish users in order to suppress reports of situations that are dangerous to and
exploitative of children.49 And one can imagine a legislative response to the
Ludlow banning-for example, a law that protects whistle blowing in virtual
worlds-that would protect both speech and children. Such a law could be
modeled on federal whistleblower statutes that forbid reprisals against those
who reveal certain types of information. 0
44. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997) (noting the tension between the
protection of minors and the First Amendment guarantees of free speech).
45. See LuDLow & WALLACE, supra note 43, at 127-43 (discussing teen virtual
prostitution in the world TSO).
46. See id. at 5-8 (describing the establishment and works of the Alphaville Herald).
47. See id. at 12-14 (describing Ludlow's expulsion from TSO).
48. Id. atxv.
49. See id. at 13 (identifying a situation in which a person publishing questionable
materials got banned from a virtual world).
50. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2006) ("It shall be unlawful for an employer to
1224
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But the conflict between speech and child protection cannot be entirely
assumed away. There are some things that adults should be able to say and do
that children certainly should not hear or see. Working out rules that permit
children and adults to safely interact, while protecting the maximum amount of
speech possible is therefore a worthwhile goal.
A full treatment of First Amendment and child protection issues is beyond
the scope of this Article. Instead, this subpart examines the First Amendment
literature as applied to virtual worlds, and then looks at some Supreme Court
cases that have encouraged technological filtering as a less restrictive means for
blocking content to minors, while permitting adults to speak freely.
This Article is not the first time that the First Amendment has been
invoked in discussions of virtual worlds. Jack Balkin, Eric Goldman, Peter
Jenkins, and I have all talked about the First Amendment from a number of
different perspectives. 5' The initial difficulty with applying the First
Amendment to virtual worlds has been that the most common censors-the
game gods-are private parties. Game gods are not yet governments, although
they trend heavily in that direction.51 As a result, most virtual world
applications of the First Amendment founder on the state-action doctrine.
Therefore, it is worth noting that, for the purposes of this Article, little of
the state-action debate matters. This Article considers the specter of real-world
legislative action, not private censoring of speech. Real-world law and
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants... because such individual ... has
opposed any practice made unlawful by this section.... ."); 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (2000 &
Supp. V 2005) ("No person shall discriminate against any individual because such individual
has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter or because such individual made
a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under this chapter."); id. § 300j-9(i)(1) (preventing discrimination against an employee
for turning in an employer in violation of provisions of this section); 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (2000
& Supp. V 2005) (providing for relief for employees who are punished by an employer as a
result of complying with the provisions of this section); 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (prohibiting
discrimination against whistleblowers in the sexual discrimination context).
51. See Balkin, supra note 39, at 2090-98 (discussing how real-world law is used to
regulate freedom in virtual worlds); Joshua Fairfield, The God Paradox, 89 B.U. L. REv. 1017
(2009); Eric Goldman, Speech Showdowns at the Virtual Corral, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 845, 850-54 (2005) (arguing that virtual worlds are not distinguishable from
other online providers and therefore we should not create special speech rules for virtual
worlds); Jenkins, supra note 39, at 18 ("[Massively Multiple Online Role Playing Games] are
the leading edge of a coming virtual world that will eventually supersede the current structure of
the Internet, providing a world-wide three-dimensional immersive platform in which we will
shop, play, socialize, travel and work.").
52. Cf Balkin, supra note 39, at 2043-44 (commenting that virtual worlds are developing
into more than just gaming, replicating many aspects of the real world); Jenkins, supra note 39,
at 1-3 (describing the similarities between a virtual world community and a real world
community).
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legislation that target online speech because of its content raise no difficulty of
state-action.
The second common snag that First Amendment accounts encounter in
virtual worlds is the speech/conduct dichotomy.53 The fighting question is
whether communications via virtual worlds are speech, expression, association,
or conduct devoid of expressive content. 4 Every novel communications
technology must surpass this hurdle. For example, the Court did not recognize
that movies were protected expression until 1952.55 Recognition that the First
Amendment protects video games seems to be more quickly forthcoming.
56
Players in virtual worlds communicate using traditional modes of speech-
voice and writing-but also can communicate via the shared three-dimensional
virtual environment. 57 Thus, virtual world technology is an even richer medium
of expression than traditional writing, speech, or movies.58 There is, therefore,
every chance that courts will seamlessly recognize that First Amendment
protection applies to expression in a virtual world just as it does to an actor on
stage.
59
53. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) ("[W]hen 'speech' and
'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important
governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on
First Amendment freedoms."); see also Rice v. Paladin Entm't, 128 F.3d 233, 243 (4th Cir.
1997) ("It is equally well established that speech which, in its effect, is tantamount to
legitimately proscribable nonexpressive conduct may itself be legitimately proscribed, punished,
or regulated incidentally to the constitutional enforcement of generally applicable statutes.").
54. Rice, 128 F.3d at 243.
55. See Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952) (overturning its 1915 decision in
Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230 (1915), in which it had
determined that movies were businesses, not speech).
56. See, e.g., Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, 329 F.3d 954, 957
(8th Cir. 2003). It states:
If the first amendment is versatile enough to shield [the] painting of Jackson
Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll, we
see no reason why the pictures, graphic design, concept art, sounds, music, stories,
and narrative present in video games are not entitled to a similar protection. The
mere fact that they appear in a novel medium is of no legal consequence.
Id (citations and quotations omitted).
57. See Balkin, supra note 39, at 2046 ("Much of what goes on in virtual worlds should
be protected against state regulation by the First Amendment rights of freedom of expression
and association."); see also id. at 2053 ("If the state regulates virtual worlds because of the ideas
expressed by the players and designers, the free speech principle is surely violated.").
58. See id. at 2054-55 ("[M]assively multiplayer games and virtual worlds are becoming
recognized as media for the communication of ideas, including every sort of representation and
recreation of human interaction .... Virtual worlds are a medium of expression, a medium in
which you can say things and express things.").
59. See id, at 2056. Balkin states:
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Even if players' interactions in virtual worlds were deemed mere conduct
rather than speech-and they are not-it would merely beg the question of
when conduct constitutes protected expression.6°  For example, erotic
conduct-say, dance-is protected.6' If Congress wishes to target conduct due
to its erotic content, it faces a quite high barrier.62 On the other hand, if a
government rule is unrelated to the content of the expression and only imposes
incidental burdens on expression, it is likely to be upheld.63 Thus, Congress
may instead seek a content-neutral approach by restricting only a nonexpressive
component, that is, access by minors, but such an approach may not chill
protected speech.64
In addition, games, particularly massively multiplayer games and virtual worlds,
have creative and interactive features that, in some ways, make them even more like
speech than motion pictures. (Just as the ability to create games is part of the
freedom to design, the ability to interact within games is part of the freedom to
play.) .... With massively multiplayer games, it is even more obvious that what is
going on is participatory. The most sophisticated multiplayer games allow you to
tell your own stories and add things to the world in which you are playing. If
movies are media for the communication of ideas, so too are massively multiplayer
games.
Id.; see also id. at 2057 ("Thus, multiplayer games are not like boxing or hockey, whose claims
to free speech protection are tenuous. A better analogy is improvisational theater.").
60. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,406-07 (1989) ("It is, in short, not simply verbal
or non-verbal nature of the expression, but the government interest at stake, that helps to
determine whether a restriction on that expression is valid.").
61. See, e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61,66(1981) ("Nor may an
entertainment program be prohibited solely because it displays the nude human figure. . . nude
dancing is not without its First Amendment protections from official regulation.").
62. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406. It states:
The Government generally has a freer hand in restricting expressive conduct that it
has in restricting the written or spoken work. It may not, however, proscribe
particular conduct because it has expressive elements.... A law directed at the
communicative nature of conduct must, like a law directed at speech itself be
justified by the substantial showing of need that the first amendment requires.
Id. (citations and quotations omitted).
63. See Rice v. Paladin Entr't, 128 F.3d 233, 243 (4th Cir. 1997); see also Robin
Fretwell Wilson, Sex Play in Virtual Worlds, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1127, 1163 (2009) (citing
RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 4.63 (2d ed. 2008)).
64. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 407. The Court stated:
Thus, although we have recognized that where 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements
are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental
interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on
First Amendment freedoms, we have limited the applicability of O'Brien's
relatively lenient standard to those cases in which the government interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression.
Id. (citations and quotations omitted).
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Claims that the government seeks to regulate conduct, not speech, will not
avail if the regulation overly impacts the ability of adults to engage in
constitutionally protected expression. 65 As the Court noted:
Here the Government wants to keep speech from children not to protect them
from its content but to protect them from those who would commit other
crimes. The principle, however, remains the same: The government cannot
ban speech fit for adults, simply because it may fall into the hands of
children .... The objective is to prohibit illegal conduct, but this restriction
goes well beyond that interest by restricting the speech available to law-
abiding adults.66
There are two basic problems. First, adults may unwittingly interact with
minors who hide behind internet anonymity.67 If unwitting interactions are
penalized, adults cannot speak with one another for fear that the person they are
interacting with may be a hidden minor.68 Avoiding liability would require all
adults to limit every word and act to those fit for children. 69 Second, the
imposition of age verification procedures, like credit card checks, would limit
the ability of some adults to engage in protected expression. 70 As discussed
below, where access restrictions for minors would functionally shut down
protected expression among adults, courts seek less restrictive alternatives.7'
Because of these considerations, the Supreme Court has long maintained
that the Constitution bars legislators from functionally restricting adults to
content "only ... fit for children. 72 "The precedents establish ... that speech
within the rights of adults to hear may not be silenced completely in an attempt
to shield children from it."73 In the internet context, this has meant that, where
users of a service are anonymous, criminal liability cannot ride on the unwitting
communication of harmful material to users who turn out to be children.74 For
65. Infra note 82.
66. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 252-53 (2002).
67. Infra note 74 and accompanying text.
68. Infra note 75 and accompanying text.
69. Infra note 72 and accompanying text.
70. Infra note 92.
71. Infra note 84.
72. See, e.g., Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 381-83 (1957) (determining legislative
restriction on sale of books "tending to the corruption of the morals of youth" unconstitutional
because "[t]he incidence of this enactment is to reduce the adult population... to reading only
what is fit for children").
73. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 252 (2002).
74. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 855 (1997) (holding sections of Communications
Decency Act unconstitutional in part because "there is no effective way to determine the identity
or age of a user").
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example, "[k]nowledge that, for instance, one or more members of a 100-
person chat group will be minor-and therefore that it would be a crime to send
the group an indecent message-would surely burden communication among
adults. 7 5 Thus, the Court held that the communication of pornographic
material to a person that the content provider does not know to be a child
cannot be grounds for criminal liability because to do so would "inevitably
curtail a significant amount of adult communication on the intemet.
' 76
Moreover, this principle is not curtailed by the characterization of a given
statute as strict liability. The Court has repeatedly held that a criminal
defendant must have some minimum chance to determine whether she is
engaged in an activity subject to strict regulation in order for the imposition of
criminal penalties to be constitutional.77 With regard to expression, "the Court
has held that punishment based on strict liability with regard to the elements
that deprive the conduct of First Amendment protections is unconstitutional.
'78
The difference between an adult who encounters a child in the real world and
one who encounters an anonymous person who could or could not be a child in
a virtual world is significant. Even if we hold the adult responsible for her real-
world actions without considering her knowledge of the minor's age, we at
least feel satisfied that she had some chance or opportunity to determine who
she was dealing with. Not so in a virtual world.
Congress has had three bites at this apple. The Communications Decency
Act (CDA),79 the Children Online Protection Act (COPA),8° and the Child
75. Id. at 876.
76. See id. (noting that it would be overly burdensome to First Amendment rights to make
liable senders who do not know if the receiver is a minor).
77. See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619-20 (1994) (reversing conviction of
unwitting owner of converted machine gun); United States v. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. 64,
66 (1994) (finding an adult video vendor who unwittingly sold tapes that included an actress
who was a minor not criminally liable). See generally Alan C. Michaels, Constitutional
Innocence, 112 HARv. L. REv. 828 (1999) (detailing constitutional restraints on use of strict
liability). Even where the Court has condoned strict liability, it has required at a minimum that
the defendant have been in such a situation as to be aware of the danger that the activity would
be strictly regulated. See Staples, 511 U.S. at 606 (noting that even public regulatory "strict
liability" crimes require at a minimum that "a defendant know[] that he is dealing with a
dangerous device of a character that places him in responsible relation to a public danger, [such
that] he should be alerted to the probability of strict regulation") (citations omitted).
78. Michaels, supra note 77, at 868.
79. See Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. §§ 230, 560-561 (2000 &
Supp. V 2005) (providing restrictions on the transmission of information based on content).
80. See Children Online Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2000 & Supp. V 2005)
(providing restrictions of access by minors to materials commercially distributed by means of
the World Wide Web).
1229
66 WASH. &LEE L. REV 1215 (2009)
Pornography Prevention Act (CPPA)8' all had similar problems.8 2 Each was
struck down. The reasoning was straightforward. Congress can only burden
speech if it uses the least restrictive means available to it.83 Traditionally, this
has meant that if Congress could achieve its goal through a different regulation
that restricted less speech, then the more restrictive legislation could not pass
constitutional muster.84
In internet cases, the Court has imported self-help filtering technologies of
communities into this constitutional test. If filtering would protect children
from smut, the Court reasoned, then a broad government law providing for
liability to people who convey harmful material to minors is not necessary.s5
The hook to government action is that Congress could promote filtering
through legislative means. 86 Further, the Court expressly welcomed the
application of filtering technologies to keep children safe in many different
forms of internet communication. Thus, the Court noted that "filters also may
be more effective because they can be applied to all forms of internet
communication.. . , not just the World Wide Web.,
87
This is an invitation to apply filtering technologies to virtual worlds. To
make the case concrete: It is possible to filter reality in a virtual world in the
way that we can filter websites on the ordinary Intemet.88 A simple version of
81. See Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (2006) (providing
restrictions regarding activities relating to child pornography).
82. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656,670 (2004) (affirming the grant of a preliminary
injunction prohibiting enforcement of COPA upon a finding that plaintiffs were likely to prevail
on the claim that legislation violated the First Amendment by burdening adults' access to some
protected speech); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 251,256 (2002) (finding that
numerous provisions of CPPA violated the First Amendment); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844,
870 (1997) (finding provisions of CDA prohibiting transmission of obscene or indecent
communications to minors to be content-based blanket restrictions on speech and therefore
violative of the First Amendment).
83. See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 814 (2000) ("[Tlhe
objective of shielding children does not suffice to support a blanket ban if the protection can be
accomplished by a less restrictive alternative.").
84. See id. at 818 ("Technology expands the capacity to choose; and it denies the potential
of this revolution if we assume the Government is best positioned to make these choices for
us."); see also Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 666 ("[A court] asks what is the least restrictive alternative
that can be used to achieve that goal .... The court should ask whether the challenged
regulation is the least restrictive means among available, effective alternatives.").
85. See Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 667-68 (finding that because the Government failed to
introduce specific evidence proving that filtering technologies are less effective than the
legislative restrictions, the legislative restrictions were enjoined).
86. Id. at 669.
87. Id. at 668.
88. See infra Part III (discussing filtering technology as an alternative to legislation).
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this technology is already ubiquitous. A user who does not wish to interact
with another user can enter the term "/ignore." As of that point, the two parties
simply cannot speak with one another within the game. More advanced
applications will be discussed below.
The speech/conduct distinction may yet yield hard cases in virtual
worlds.89 But it is not hard to discern that Congress's current apparent
regulatory trajectory will run afoul of established case law. For example, in its
consideration of virtual worlds regulation, Congress has again taken aim at
content, not conduct, by directing the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to
report on the availability of explicit material to children in virtual worlds. 9°
Moreover, commentators expect that the FTC will recommend requiring age
verification by credit card to prevent children from accessing virtual worlds that
adults use.91 Both the content-targeting and credit card verification elements
have been previously rejected by the Court.92 The answer should not change
merely because virtual worlds are a novel technology. A more measured
legislative approach would promote the development and use of filtering and
parental control technologies in virtual worlds, in lieu of either a blanket ban on
certain content due to the risk of children accessing it, or of anonymity
stripping measures such as mandatory credit card verification.
C. The Effect of Isolation on Children
It is not enough to note that adult discourse would be fundamentally
threatened by the imposition of legal liability for unwitting interaction with
avatars run by children. This Article also argues that internet segregation will
render children vulnerable. Once all decent adults are driven away from
children--by virtue of their fear of being overheard or duped-then only
predators will remain among the children.93 Predators, who of course have no
89. See Wilson, supra note 63, at 1164-71 (arguing that virtual sex may be sanctioned as
conduct consistent with the First Amendment).
90. See supra note I (noting the existence of an urge to legislate).
91. FTC May Urge Virtual Age Verification, NAT'L J. ONLINE, July 27, 2009, http://
techdailydose.nationaljoumal.com/2009/07/ftc-may-urge-virtual-age-verif.php (last visited Sept.
29, 2009) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
92. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656,667 (2004) (determining that age verification
via credit card did not save COPA, because "[u]nder a filtering regime, adults without children
may gain access to speech they have a right to see without having to identify themselves or
provide their credit card information").
93. See Szoka & Thierer, supra note 19, at 30 ("The effect of age stratification on truly
bad actors is likely to be marginal at best--or harmful at worst: Building walls around
adolescents through age-verification might actually make it easier for predators to target
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qualms about passing themselves off as children to access online spaces, will
not be deterred.94 This is hardly the state of affairs that the law ought to strive
to create.
Predators desire to get children alone, and to generate separation and
secrecy between the child and parents or other adults who might stop the
abuse.95 Internet predators are no different, seeking isolated comers of the
Internet, generally overpopulated by children, for their abuse.96 Isolation and
secrecy are the predator's watchwords. 97 Driving adults and children apart in
virtual worlds achieves both of the predator's ends: It gives the predator an
adult-free zone in which to operate, 98 and it gives the predator a free hand to
inculcate secrecy and attempt to arrange a real-world meeting with the child.99
Finally, separating adults from children in online spaces will increase the
risk and virulence of bullying or other adolescent-to-adolescent harm.I°° This
teens .. ").
94. See L. Alvin Malesky, Jr., Predatory Online Behavior: Modus Operandi of Convicted
Sex Offenders in Identifying Potential Victims and Contacting Minors over the Internet, 16 J.
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 23, 24 (2007) ("Because the Internet can provide anonymity for its users,
adults can misrepresent their age and even present themselves as adolescents while interacting
with actual minors online.").
95. Jon R. Conte et al., What Sexual Offenders Tell Us About Prevention Strategies, 13
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 293, 293 (1989) (noting that predation "involved efforts to separate
children from other adults who might protect them").
96. See Malesky, Jr., supra note 94, at 26 (noting that "[t]wenty-five individuals (81%)
reported visiting chat rooms geared towards minors for the purpose of meeting
children/adolescents").
97. See generally Conte et al., supra note 95 (describing the behavior of sexual predators
and prevention strategies); Janis Wolak et al., Online "Predators" and Their Victims, 63 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 111, 118 (2008) (commenting that risky behavior on the part of adolescents
included chatting to unknown parties); Catherine D. Marcum, Interpreting the Intentions of
Internet Predators: An Examination of Online Predatory Behavior, 16 J. CHILD SEX ABUSE 99
(2007) (discussing the increased amount of child sexual abuse on the Internet, the often blatant
tactics used by online predators to pursue this abuse, and how they are continuing to
successfully manipulate children with them).
98. See Conte et al., supra note 95, at 297 (noting that "isolation, closeness, [and] contact
are more important than verbal seduction" for a sexual predator).
99. See generally Stefan C. Drombrowski et al., Protecting Children from Online Sexual
Predators: Technological, Psychoeducational, and Legal Considerations, 35 PROF. PSYCHOL:
RES. & PRAC. 65 (2004) (reviewing the general strategies of sexual perpetrators and their
characteristics, as well as the online strategies and characteristics of the cyber sexual predator);
Malesky, Jr., supra note 94 (discussing the online activity of thirty-one men who perpetrated or
attempted to perpetrate contact sex offenses against minors with whom they communicated via
the Internet).
100. See PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 3, at 95 ("The data that we do have demonstrate
that inasmuch as we should be worrying about the danger of violence on the Internet, we should
be worrying about kids hurting each other psychologically-and not as focused, as we seem to
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risk is as serious a consideration as adult-to-child harm, if only because it is far
more common. °1' A major restraining force on child-to-child harm is the
presence of responsible adults, who can de-escalate the behavior. 10 2 Creating
virtual playgrounds without adults will increase the incidence and severity of
child-to-child harm. 0 3 Driving responsible adults-including parents--out of
virtual worlds that parents had heretofore shared with children would achieve
precisely this result.'14
Instead of segregating children from adults, legislators wishing to protect
children should foster and promote the development of tools that parents and
teachers can use to protect children in virtual worlds. 10 5 The best technology
for doing this is unsurprisingly the same technology that the Court has
previously turned to in its prior internet jurisprudence: Filtering.
111. Filtering and Virtual Worlds
Filtering technology presents a unique opportunity for virtual worlds: As
noted in Part II.B, above, if virtual-world filtering technology is good enough,
Congress must promote this technology rather than enact broad regulatory
mandates that are intended to protect children, but inhibit speech. At the
outset, it is worth distinguishing between filtering of virtual worlds and filtering
within virtual worlds. Virtual worlds can be filtered just like websites. Many
virtual worlds, like Club Penguin or Webkinz, are in fact websites. Thus,
regular internet filters will work for parents who wish to filter their children's
access to virtual worlds. This kind of filtering technology has been discussed at
length in the case law.' °6 This Article, therefore, focuses on filtering within
virtual worlds. The question is whether the filtering technology available
within virtual worlds is good enough to both provide the badly needed
protection for children and stave off parentalist legislation. This Article
submits that filtering technology in virtual worlds is impressive but still of




104. See Malesky, Jr., supra note 94, at 29 ("[P]arents and/or guardians should be involved
with their children's online activity. They should know who their children communicate with
via the Internet as well as not allow them to spend inordinate amounts of time online.").
105. See PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 3, at 110 ("Parents and teachers need to become a
much bigger part of the solution, and soon.").
106. Supra Part ll.B.
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limited availability to players, and that filtering could and should be made
better still by the introduction of flagging and reputation systems.
A. Basic Chat Filtering
The state of the technology is changing rapidly, but as of the writing of
this Article, there are some basic discernable trends. First, filtering of text, as
regards sexual, scatological, or otherwise profane language, is already largely
possible. 10 7 If players do not desire to hear coarse language, then they may
simply turn on the language filter and the offensive language will be edited
out.l°0 Moreover, characters may filter one another by simply turning off the
ability of another person to contact them via the ignore command. 109
But these simple filters will not be sufficient to fully protect children or
fend off legislation. Current filters will not prevent work-arounds, such as the
substitution of numbers for letters (in oft-mocked "Leetspeak") or other
inventive use of characters to circumvent controls. Moreover, current filters do
not do a good job of filtering inappropriate user-generated content.110 Thus, the
following sections discuss not only the power to edit the text that a person sees
in a computer-mediated environment but also the power to, in fact, edit that
reality so that objectionable content is filtered out for one person, but not for
others.
B. Filtering Reality: Instancing and Quest-Phasing
In a virtual world, reality itself can be edited on an individual basis.
Instancing technology is especially promising. The largest advance in game
play over the past several years has been the advance in the degree to which the
107. Cf. World of Warcraft, Community Site, http://www.worldofwarcraft.com (last visited
Sept. 29, 2009) (providing basic filtering options for users).
108. Cf World of Warcraft, Blizzard Support, http://us.blizzard.com/support/article.xml?
locale=en-US&articleId=20455 (last visited Sept. 29, 2009) (providing a language filter) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
109. Cf. id. (providing an ignore command filter).




shared experience of a virtual world can be edited. "' Players now do not share
the same reality, they share overlapping experiences.'
1 2
The original problem that instances were meant to address was that of
scarce resources. Imagine trying to kill Greg the Goblin to get his magical
sword. If you must compete with everyone else in the virtual environment for
the chance to kill Greg, you may suffer serious frustration. Other players are in
line to kill Greg, too. Even if Greg "respawns," or reappears (to give another
player a chance to enjoy the same content), other players may simply "spawn
camp" or steal the kill.
To deal with problems of spawncamping and killstealing, game designers
invented instances.'13 If Greg lives in an instanced cave, when you enter the
cave, you actually enter your own pocket universe. In your own "instance" of
the cave, Greg is always there. Any other player who enters Greg's cave will
encounter Greg-but not you.
How is this possible? Whenever you enter the cave, the game server
generates a one-off copy-a single-player version of the content-of Greg's
cave. Within that cave, you and your friends are the only ones who exist.
Other people cannot disrupt your game experience. But this pocket universe is
still connected to the larger game world. Once you defeat Greg and return to
town, everyone can see the magical sword you won. In town, you have
rejoined the rest of the shared experience.
However, in order to experience instanced content, players had to separate
themselves from the rest of the shared experience for a while.' 14 The next
challenge was to make it possible to "edit" reality so that people who shared a
common space were actually experiencing different realities in some respects.
This next step was called quest-phasing.
Quest-phasing permits a static world to appear to change.n 5 The original
problem was this: Imagine, in a non-instanced, non-phased world, player A
kills Greg the Goblin. Either the game server now considers Greg "dead," and
thus no other player can experience that content, or the game server "respawns"
111. See CASTRONOVA, supra note 25, at 118-19 (explaining the mechanism of
"instancing" content which "occurs when a player triggers the creation of content that is
accessible to her and no one else").
112. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (describing instancing and its effects).
113. See CASTRONOVA, supra note 25, at 118-19 (describing instances and its purpose).
114. See supra notes 11, 113 and accompanying text (describing instances and discussing
their affect on gaming).
115. See Interview with J. Allen Brack, Producer, Wrath of the Lich King, in Leipzig,
F.R.G. (Aug. 22, 2008), http://www.eurogamer.net/articles/world-of-warcraft-wrath-of-the-lich-
king_9 (last visited Sept. 29, 2009) (discussing the use of quest phasing rather than instancing in
Wrath of the Lich King) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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Greg, leading to a disruption of the suspension of disbelief-"hey wait," says
player A, "I just killed that guy. What's he doing still walking around, much
less fighting player B?" Thus, if one player's act changed the world, that
disrupted the experience of other players, who wished to perform the same
quest. (Of course, the alternative--creating new quests for every player based
on the prior actions of other players-is completely impossible from a design
standard.)
Quest-phasing fixed this problem.1 6 If the quest to kill Greg the Goblin is
phased, and if player A kills Greg, then for player A, Greg is indeed dead. But
because player B has not killed Greg, then for player B, the goblin still lives.
Note that for all other intents and purposes, player A and player B share a
reality--each sees what the other sees, they can talk, go on other quests
together. Their realities differ only when it comes to Greg.
Instancing and quest-phasing show that the technology exists to permit
players to edit their realities without sacrificing the overlap, or shared
experience, that makes virtual worlds so interesting. The technology filters the
world based on the players' past experiences. 1 7 It is not difficult to see how
the technology might be extended in the direction of filtering other content.
Just as the goblin might exist for player B but not player A, so grown-up
content might exist for player A, an adult, but not player B, a child. This reality-
editing function could extend to other players as well. A player C might well
exist for A, but not for A's child, B. (This is already the case with
conversation-B can turn C's ability to speak to B off.)"1
8
These technologies do not exist in all virtual worlds, nor do they work the
same way in every virtual world. But the theme-that filtering works in virtual
worlds as well or even better than on the mainstream Intemet--ought to give
parentalist legislators pause. This opportunity also should give game designers
food for thought. Filtering technology has a long way to go in virtual worlds.
The most powerful technologies are not in the hands of the players--only the
game god can spawn an instance or set up quest-phasing. Game gods ought to
give players access to good filters if they wish to avoid regulation-especially
when it comes to parents who are looking for ways to filter their children's in-
game experiences. Further, game gods ought to make the filters that they have
116. See id. ("As you bring [the villagers] back to your quest hub, those villagers are there
permanently for you, whereas if somebody who hasn't done the quest shows up, they don't see
them.").
117. See id. (noting that people who complete certain quests will be able to see common
things, but those that have not completed the quest will not be able to see those things).




already developed even better-by combining filtering technology with
flagging and reputation systems, as discussed below.
C. Making Filtering Better
Filtering can be made even more effective if one embraces its counterpart,
flagging. Where filtering edits out content from existence, flagging permits
creators of content, or speakers, to identify their content in order to receive a
safe harbor and permit better filtering." 9 Suppose one were to adopt a rule
granting an absolute safe harbor to any speaker or creator of "adult" content
(and by this I mean content fit for adult consumption, not merely or mostly
sexual content) if that person "flags" the content, or identifies it as containing
material for adults.
In turn, filtering software can more easily read the flag. Instead of having
to guess whether content is safe or not, the filter can automatically identify and
filter out self-identified adult content. In this way, violent imagery, strong
language, and even boring academic articles could be flagged as "adult" to
prevent damage to unwitting children. A safe harbor for flagged content thus
makes filtering more effective.
People could even flag their own conversations. It is common practice in
a virtual world to speak in several different "channels" simultaneously. A "say"
command causes everyone in the local area to hear your comment. A "gu"
command causes only your guild members to hear you speak, no matter where
they are in the world. Other channels exist for specific purposes: A "trade
channel" permits parties to hawk their virtual wares, while a "local defense
channel" permits the organization of player-versus-player combat within the
world.
The trick is that channels are a simple form of instancing: You can speak
in multiple channels while sharing a simulated physical space with someone
else, and the people you are near do not experience all the channels that you do.
Thus, it is perfectly possible to have an adult conversation in one channel and a
more "PG" conversation in another channel, without spillover. (Okay, there is
the occasional spillover, called a "misstell," that is the stuff of internet hilarity,
but the point remains a good one.)
119. Cf What is Flagging? Parenthood.corn, http://www.community.parenthood.com/topic/
4967 (last visited Sept. 29, 2009) (noting that when someone flags a site, a report is sent to a
group of individuals who will then check out the site) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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People could thus flag their channels "PG" or "M," the way they currently
select channels for other purposes. And it goes without saying that people who
do not wish to hear the content would not be obliged to join the channel.
Further, parents could set filters such that a child could not access such
channels. In short, it is possible to protect adult speakers and child listeners
without legislation that threatens to split up virtual worlds.
Once one embraces flagging as a way of enhancing filtering technology,
there are all sorts of ways to make filters better. Players might flag not only
their own content but also one another. One major system for self-regulation
through e-commercial sites is a reputation system. eBay, for example, permits
parties to rate one another based on prior commercial experience. 20 This
technology is already readily apparent in forum bulletin boards. Many online
fora are choked with random, irrelevant, or obnoxious posts. The forum host
could opt to review each post, and remove offensive or irrelevant content.
Instead, many sites use a rating system. Posts are rated on their usefulness
by the readers.' 21 If a post falls below a certain rating, it is not displayed.
Thus, objectionable content is edited nearly out of existence by the player
rating system. The content is still available, but special effort must be made to
access low-rated content.
A reputation add-on to a filtering system could do much to increase the
value of the underlying system.1 22 If player A encounters player B, who has a
bad reputation, player A may already have filters in effect such that player B
does not exist as far as A is concerned.
Of course reputation can be gamed, primarily through the practice of
reanonymization, where a party who has an unsavory reputation creates a new
online identity in order to escape her bad name. But reanonymization does not
always--or even often-work because people refuse to deal with someone who
has no reputation. For example, in the virtual world Second Life, avatars that
have been created very recently are not permitted into many areas because they
are likely to be reanonymized users who are attempting to "grief' (harass) other
120. See Feedback Forum, eBay, http://pages.ebay.com/services/forum/feedback.html (last
visited Sept. 29, 2009) (providing an overview of eBay's user rating system) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
121. Cf. Internet Movie Database, http://www.imdb.com (last visited Sept. 29, 2009)
(allowing users to rate the usefulness of other users' comments).
122. See BOELLSTORFF, supra note 24, at 228 (discussing the evolution of the user rating
system in Second Life); CASTRONOVA, supra note 25, at 23 ("Human societies rely so much on




players on an "alt" (alternative character or identity) while preventing
reputational harm to that player's "main" (primary identity).
123
D. Commerce, Anonymity, and Filtering
If anonymity is the shield of bad actors, commerce is the sword which
pierces that shield. If real money is being exchanged, both companies and
consumers must know with whom they are dealing. Thus, the oft-maligned
intrusion of real-world economics into virtual worlds is a powerful source of
trust and protection for players of all ages.
In COPA, described above, Congress attempted to mandate credit card
numbers in an age-verification system for internet users. 124 This served two
purposes. First, the credit card number provided pretty good evidence that the
person was not a minor. 2 Second, the credit card number tied the customer to
a real-world identity.1 26 Because of this second factor, the Court found that
requiring the disclosure of credit card information chilled legitimate speech,
and that the credit card requirement was not the least restrictive means by
which Congress could achieve its goals.127
But there is nothing invasive or chilling about facilitating voluntary
disclosure of information by a customer in order to improve filtering. For
example, in the virtual world Second Life, if a customer uses a credit card in
conjunction with an avatar, then that avatar's publicly-available profile
discloses this fact and states: "[P]ayment information on file."'
128
If a user is attempting to remain anonymous from the game god, of course
no payment information will be used. But if payment information is on file,
this means that the real-world identity behind the avatar may be subpoenaed
from the game god. 2 9 An additional fact: Many game worlds record their
123. See BOELLSTORFF, supra note 24, at 235 ("[Tlhe ability to join Second Life without
providing any identifying information made many residents concerned; they complained that the
grid was being flooded with persons bent on griefing, and also that it would be easier for
children to enter Second Life, raising issues of ethics and legal liability.").
124. See Ashcrofi v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 662 (2004) (providing the language of the
statute).
125. See id. (noting that the statute allows for the establishment of an affirmative defense if
a website seeks to identify users by requiring a credit card number).
126. Id.
127. See id, at 667 (finding filters to be less burdensome on First Amendment rights than
restricting access online through legislation).
128. BOELLSTORFF, supra note 24, at 235.
129. See Tal Zarsky, Privacy and Data Collection in Virtual Worlds, in THE STATE OF
PLAY: LAW, GAMEs, AND VIRTUAL WoRLDS 217, 221-22 (Jack M. Balkin & Beth Simone
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players' conversations for customer service purposes. 130 Thus, revealing real-
world information to the game god goes beyond a simple piercing of anonymity
in the event that a player commits a bad act. In virtual worlds, the fact that
another user has now disclosed her real-world identity to the game god is
enormously useful in determining who to trust.
Online commerce is a powerful force for reducing online anonymity-and
thus the threat of online bad acts-without government coercion.' 3 ' The
elegance of this system is that it does not mandate disclosure of credit card
information-as Congress attempted-but instead permits a user to self-
identify as particularly worthy of trust. 132  Those who wish to remain
anonymous can do so. They will simply not be trusted as much, and may be
subject to filtering, as discussed below.
133
This fits with norms in virtual worlds. "Alt" characters are often used, as
noted above, to engage in bad acts, while "main" characters are much more
rarely used for that sort of activity. A player who wishes to harass or grief
another player will only rarely do so on her "main" character. And the more
egregious the action, the more likely that a player will use an alternative
account to commit the deed. Alts are, therefore, routinely distrusted in virtual
worlds, since the chance of an alt being a reanonymized player is higher than
the alt being simply a new player.
It is of course possible to combine these e-commercial identification
techniques with filters. A child's filter could be set to edit out anyone who has
not given their identity to the game god provider via a credit card number. In
short, if a child can filter alts, they have removed a powerful tool used by
griefers and harassers of all kinds.
IV. Necessary Law Enforcement in Virtual Worlds
Remember what this Article is not saying. This Article does not claim that
virtual worlds should not ban sexual predators. They can and must. The KIDS
Noveck eds., 2006) (noting that the identity of a website user may be obtained through the use
of the user's payment information).
130. See id. at 218, 221-22 (noting that conversation in virtual worlds can be stored and
used for identification purposes).
131. BOELLSTORFF, supra note 24, at 234-35 (stating that government involvement is not
necessary to obtain identification information from users if the users are involved with
commercial activities).
132. Id.
133. See id. at 235 (commenting that the choice involved when deciding whether to
identify oneself aids in separating the trustworthy from those not so trustworthy).
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Act of 2008,134 which provides social networking sites with access to the
national sexual offender database, also provides civil immunity for suits based
on using that database and excluding sex offenders from the social network. 135
Virtual world providers are social networks first and games second. Thus,
virtual world game gods ought to have little difficulty claiming the civil
immunity of the KIDS Act.
If the KIDS Act is the carrot, then state Attorneys General are the stick.
State AGs have now sought, and received, settlements with Facebook and
MySpace that require those sites to police their sites for predators and respond
quickly to consumer complaints. 136 Although these site operators would be
within their rights to stand on their CDA § 230 immunity 137 to claims premised
on the bad acts of third parties, they have not chosen to take the risk, and have
settled instead. Virtual world game gods would be wise to take notice:
Improving filtering technology may affect specific attempts by Congress to
legislate within virtual worlds, but good filters, as well as good procedures for
responding to complaints, are also necessary to prevent claims from state AGs
(as well as the negative publicity those claims generate).
Further, this Article does not argue that police ought not to enforce the law
in virtual worlds. This Author has long argued that police and courts need no
special adaptations to apply real-world law in virtual worlds. Certain
applications of real-world law that do not take into account the unique nature of
interactions in virtual worlds, however, run the risk of cyberbalkanization, as
noted above.
For example, if police were to pursue claims of lewd and lascivious
conduct toward virtual world denizens who had every reason to believe that
they were engaged in conversations with other adults, this would first be a clear
violation of the First Amendment principles set forth when the Supreme Court
134. See 42 U.S.C. § 16915a et seq. (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (stating requirements for sex
offenders regarding websites).
135. See id. § 16915b(c)(5) ("A civil claim against a social networking website, including
any director, officer, employee, parent, contractor, or agent of that social networking website,
arising from the use by such website of the National Sex Offender Registry, may not be brought
in any Federal or State court.").
136. See Nathan Olivarez-Giles, Internet Social Sites Target Sex Offenders, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 4, 2009, at C3 (stating that information on 90,000 sex offenders using MySpace was turned
over to Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal's office in response to a subpoena);
Jenna Wortham, MySpace Turns over 90, 000 Names ofRegistered Sex Offenders, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 4, 2009, at B4 (noting that MySpace was pressured into turning over the names of sex
offenders in response to a subpoena); Facebook Drops Sex Offenders, supra note 6 (stating that
Facebook has removed over 5,000 sex offenders from its site).
137. See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (noting protections and public policy
rationale for providing some immunity to site operators).
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struck down most of the CDA, COPA, and CPPA.138 And, even if it were not,
the enforcement of such rules against such parties would cause people either to
abandon virtual worlds technology, or to balkanize the worlds.
Fortunately, police have been sensitive to online constitutional and
cultural differences. Police in virtual worlds have followed the trend of chat
room enforcement elsewhere. Police do not pursue virtual world denizens who
honestly believe they are speaking to other adults, in the privacy of their own
virtual homes or within adults-only clubs. Rather, police do the precise
opposite: They pose as children, and target those who seek to turn virtual
encounters with children into real-world encounters. 39
In sum, game gods can and should keep predators out of virtual worlds,
and real-world police ought to find and arrest predators inside virtual worlds.
But they ought to continue the practice of targeting those who seek out children
for sex, rather than targeting anyone who unwittingly provides offensive
content that is accessed by children.
V. Conclusion
Parents should play alongside their children. The law is no substitute for
parental involvement and supervision. If the statutes that legislators enact, or
the common law principles that courts deploy, place adults at risk for being in
proximity with children, then adults will exit virtual worlds entirely or will
move to separate worlds. This will increase the risk to children, both because
responsible adults will not be present to blow the whistle on cultures of secrecy
and isolation, and because parents will not be aware of the risks of their
children's behavior since they will no longer share a context.
138. See supra notes 76-85 and accompanying text (discussing the cases that struck down
most of the CDA, COPA, and CPPA as overly burdensome on First Amendment rights).
139. See Pat Kimbrough, Sheriffs Ramp up Online Investigations, HIGH PoINT ENTERPRISE,
Feb. 22, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 3454063 (discussing the acts of the Piedmont Internet
Crimes Against Children Task Force in trying to catch sexual predators); Todd South, New Task
Force Goes After Sex Predators, CHATrANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, Aug. 12, 2008,
http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/2008/aug/12/catoosa-county-new-task-force-goes-after-
sex-preda/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2009) ("A newly formed, multi-agency task force lets
authorities go after online sex predators instead of waiting until they have a victim.") (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Eleven Arrested in Internet Sex Sting, CINCINNATI
POST, Apr. 17, 2007, at A2 (discussing the decision and results of the Kentucky Attorney
General's choice to use impersonation to go after sexual predators). See generally Dateline
NBC, To Catch a Predator (NBC television broadcast), available at http://www.




Virtual worlds present a thrilling opportunity: They can put communities
back together. Parents and children can and do play together in virtual
worlds-not out of a sense of obligation by the parent, but because both parents
and children find the games fun. Players from across the political spectrum
achieve common goals and cooperate. Virtualization technology has a reverse
balkanization effect, a regenerative effect on community. Laws that function to
exile adults from these worlds both destroy the promise of the technology and
actively decrease protection for children in virtual worlds.

